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COMMENT
"Superiorfund" - An Answer to State
Court Holdings that Government-
Mandated Cleanup Costs Constitute
"Damages" under Comprehensive
General Liability Policies
Lynn M. Kuchta
This comment analyzes the state high court deci-
sions which seem to be reaching a consensus that the
term "damages" in a Comprehensive General Liability
policy encompasses the cost of cleaning up a hazardous
waste site. In six state high court cases, the courts held
in favor of the insureds, holding that cleanup costs con-
stitute "damages." In only three state high court cases, "
decided by two courts, the holdings were in favor of in-
surers with rulings that cleanup costs do not constitute
"damages." Two possible solutions to resolve the insur-
ance carriers' dilemma regarding the "damages" ques-
tion are proposed in this comment. The preferred alter-
native is to amend the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and make
cleanup costs an uninsurable interest. With reimburse-
ment of cleanup costs by insurers an impossibility, an
alternative to insurance would be necessary. The author
1
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proposes a solution to the problem in the creation of a
pollution fund to clean up hazardous waste sites. As a
less desirable alternative, the author recommends that
insurance carriers seek alternatives to litigation such as
settling out of court.
I. Introduction
This comment will discuss whether government-man-
dated cleanup costs associated with hazardous waste sites con-
stitute "damages" under the Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) insurance policy. As an introduction, a hypothetical
will be presented to illustrate the significance of this issue.
Next, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 will be briefly outlined
as it applies to the issue. A description of the CGL insurance
policy will follow.
In the second section of this comment, a background of
the "damages" issue will be presented. The background sec-
tion discusses two opposing positions taken by the federal
courts. The first is the position that cleanup costs do not con-
stitute "damages" and is made up of three different theories.
These three theories include: a legal/technical reading of the
word "damages," the position that cleanup costs are equitable
or injunctive relief and finally, that cleanup costs are prophy-
lactic measures. The second and opposing position will discuss
the holdings of the federal courts which find that cleanup
costs constitute "damages." This position relies on two sepa-
rate theories. The first theory uses a plain, ordinary meaning
of the term "damage" to hold that cleanup costs constitute
damages, while the second theory focuses on the substance of
governmental cleanup mandates to arrive at the same
conclusion.
The third section of this comment focuses on the recent
state high court decisions which have addressed the "dam-
ages" issue. As in the federal courts, the state decisions are
divided on this issue. The first part of the third section will
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
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discuss those cases which hold that cleanup costs do not con-
stitute "damages." This position relies on three different theo-
ries to reach its conclusion. These theories include the reason-
able person standard, the lack of understanding theory and
the theory that cleanup costs are preventive measures. The
second part of the section will discuss the three theories which
the courts use to arrive at the opposite conclusion; that
cleanup costs constitute "damages." This position uses the
plain meaning theory, the reasonable person standard and
also provides a limitation on the term "damages."
The fourth section of this comment will provide an analy-
sis of the problem and the fifth will offer two possible solu-
tions to the problem. The final section will present a conclu-
sion to summarize the comment.
A. Hypothetical
The following hypothetical serves to demonstrate why the
insurance industry needs to find new alternatives to address
the recent state court holdings that government-mandated
cleanup costs constitute "damages". under CGL policies.
The ABC Company (ABC) is a paint products manufac-
turer in Cleanville, Montana. Between 1965 and 1976, it dis-
posed of its manufacturing by-products at the Tidywaste dis-
posal site. In December 1986, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ordered ABC to re-
move all drums and waste from the facility.
In 1966, The Surepay Insurance Company (Surepay) and
ABC entered into a standard form CGL policy for the period
from January 1, 1966, through January 1, 1969. The policy
stated that the company would pay "on behalf of the insured,
all sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence."
The EPA placed the Tidywaste disposal site on the Na-
tional Priorities List2 in 1987 and notified ABC of its poten-
2. 40 C.F.R § 300.5 (1990). National Priorities List "means the list, compiled by
EPA pursuant to CERCLA section 105, of uncontrolled hazardous substance releases
in the United States that are priorities for long-term remedial evaluation and re-
1991]
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tial liability under CERCLA. Under an administrative consent
agreement, ABC attempted to remedy the damage at the site
and expended two million dollars in the cleanup effort. ABC
then requested that Surepay reimburse it for the two million
dollars under its CGL policy. Surepay denied coverage to
ABC stating that the term "damages" in the CGL policy did
not cover the costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. ABC
brought a declaratory judgment action against Surepay seek-
ing coverage for the costs of the remedial action. It is now
1991, and the litigation continues.
This hypothetical presents the controversial issue of who
will pay for government-mandated cleanup costs associated
with hazardous waste sites governed by CERCLA - the in-
sured or the insurer? This comment will describe the analyti-
cal process used in the recent decisions of the state courts of
last resort and suggest solutions to resolve this problem.
B. CERCLA's Language
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted in 1980 and
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA).' The statute was enacted in an effort to
eliminate unsafe hazardous waste sites. CERCLA, commonly
known as Superfund, gives the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) several alternatives for responding
to the release of hazardous substances." It authorizes "the
President [or the President's agents] to remove or arrange for
the removal of . . . hazardous substance[s], pollutant[s], or
contaminant[s], or take any other response measure ... which
the President deems necessary to protect the public health or
welfare or the environment."' 5 This statutory language allows
sponse." Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. The program was reauthorized in 1986 under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
4. David J. Hayes & Conrad B. MacKerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate,
BNA SPECIAL REPORt 4 (1987).
5. CERCLA § 104(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
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the EPA to undertake the cleanup itself and then, following
cleanup, to bring an action to recover the cleanup costs from
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) who contributed to the
release of hazardous substances at the site. A second alterna-
tive is to require the PRPs to finance and implement the
cleanup program themselves under an administrative consent
order.
The section of CERCLA most relevant to this discussion
is section 107(a) which identifies the PRP's liability. The ap-
plicable section provides in part:
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,..
. or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State . . ;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other persoh ... ; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natu-
ral resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release.7
Thus, the two types of damages are for cleanup or response
costs (A) - (B) and natural resource damages (C). While this
statute identifies who is liable for, and who may perform the
cleanup, it does not answer the question of whether a PRP
will be indemnified for the costs of cleanup under its CGL
policy. Presumably, a PRP will attempt to recover its costs
from an insurance company with whom it holds or held a lia-
6. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). See also, John F. Wagner Jr., Annota-
tion, Validity and Construction of § 106(a) and (b)(1) of Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 9606(a) and
(b)(1)), Authorizing Equitable Abatement Actions and Administrative Orders and
Prescribing Fines for Noncompliance with such Orders, 87 A.L.R. FED. 217, 226(1988).
7. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
1991]
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bility insurance policy. To date, insurance companies have
typically denied the PRP's claim for cleanup or response
costs, and either the PRP or the insurance company has
brought a declaratory action to determine whether or not cov-
erage is available under the policy. The courts then have the
burden of interpreting the language of the insurance policy.
C. The Comprehensive General Liability Policy
The insurance policy usually at issue in CERCLA recov-
ery actions is called the Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) policy. The first standard form for CGL insurance was
developed and made available in 1940.8 In 1966, the standard
CGL policy defined the term "damages" for the first time.
"Damages" included "damages for death and for care and loss
of services resulting from bodily injury and damages for loss
of use of property resulting from property damage."9 In 1973,
the "damages" definition was deleted from the CGL policy. 10
CGL insurance was so named because it consisted of a
comprehensive insuring agreement covering all hazards within
the scope of the insuring agreement that were not specifically
excluded." Since the CGL policy is a contract, its coverage
can best be understood by examining its exclusions, defini-
tions and other policy provisions.12 However, a few generaliza-
tions can be made. The coverage of a CGL policy includes a
"broad insuring agreement providing for the insurer's duty to
defend suits against the insured and to pay damages for which
the insured is found liable."1 3 Typically, the CGL policy will
contain the following passage:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all
8. Mark K. Suri, Taking the Insurers to The Dumps: Interpreting "Dam-
ages"-Is There Coverage for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under Comprehen-
sive General Liability Insurance?, 13 J. CORP. L. 1101, 1108 (1988) [hereinafter Suri].
9. Id. at 1110.
10. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 84 (1971).
11. The National Underwriter Company, FC&S - The Fire Casualty & Surety
Bulletins, B-2, (1983)[hereinafter The National Underwriter Company].
12. Id.
13. Id. at Ba-1.
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sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of:
Coverage A-bodily injury or
Coverage B-property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence,
and the company shall have the right and duty to defend
any suit against the insured seeking damages on account
of such bodily injury or property damage."
The interpretation of the policy language quoted above is
where the dispute begins. This discussion will focus particu-
larly on the interpretation of the term "damages" in the in-
suring agreement. Both the federal and the recent state courts
of last resort are divided on how to interpret this term.
II. Background
This section discusses the two opposing positions taken
by the federal courts in reference to the "damages" issue. The
first position holds that cleanup costs do not constitute dam-
ages, while the second position holds the opposite view.
A. Cleanup Costs Do Not Constitute Damages
The cases which hold that cleanup costs do not constitute
"damages" recoverable under CGL policies generally rely on
one of three positions.' 5 The first position interprets the word
"damages" in a legal or technical way.'6 The second position
14. DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER
COMPANY, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY - THE NEW CLAIMS - MADE AND OCCURENCE
FORMS, 113-14 (2d ed. 1986).
15. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir.
1988)(insurer had no duty to defend an action brought by the United States to re-
cover its costs in removing wastes from an insured's property); Mraz v. Canadian
Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986)(response costs themselves are
not "damages"); Grisham v. Maryland Casualty Co., No. 88-3063, slip op. at 3 (W.D.
Ark. Jan. 18, 1989)(cleanup costs do not constitute sums the insured is legally obli-
gated to pay as damages); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ormond, No. 87-3038, slip op. at
13 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 6, 1989)("cleanup costs are not encompassed within the meaning
of the word 'damages' in the standard form CGL polic[y]"); Fort McHenry Lumber
Co. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., No. HAR-88-825, slip op. at 6 (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 23, 1988)(recovery for costs incurred for cleanup are precluded).
16. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
1991]
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asserts that cleanup costs are equitable or injunctive in nature
and do not constitute "damages, ' 17 while the third position
holds that cleanup costs are prophylactic measures as opposed
to damages. 18
1. Legal/Technical Meaning
The first position is based upon a narrow, legal/technical
reading of the word "damages." This position begins by refer-
ring to the language of the contract. An insurance policy is a
contract, the terms of which must be interpreted using state
law." Many states require the language of an insurance con-
tract to be given its plain meaning, and if the language is am-
biguous, the ambiguity will be construed in favor of the in-
sured.20 In other circumstances the term "damages" is found
to be ambiguous; however, the Eighth Circuit in Continental
Insurance Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co. (NEPACCO) found that the term "damages" is not am-
977, 985 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)(finding that the term
"damages" is not ambiguous in the insurance context and that the plain meaning of
"damages" does not include cleanup costs); Cedar Chem. Corp. v. American Universal
Ins. Co., No. 87-2838-4B, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 1989)("in the insurance
context, the term 'damages' has acquired the plain and ordinary meaning of legal
damages" and therefore cleanup costs are not covered).
17. Maryland Casualty v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd, 822
F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988)(claim seeking com-
pliance with regulatory directives does not constitute a claim for "damages" under
the insurance policy); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp.
742, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (environmental cleanup costs were not within coverage of
property damage policy because recovery of such costs is an equitable remedy);
Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1988)(cost
recovery claims under CERCLA do not seek "damages" relief, but are restitutionary
in nature); Headley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D.S.D.
1989)(injunctive relief claim for state environmental statute was not covered because
the claim was not for a sum of money which fell under the terms of the policy's
coverage).
18. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437,
450 (D. Kan. 1990)(response costs are the expense of preventing or mitigating an in-
jury and are distinct from "damages"); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 1252, 1255-6 (D. Md. 1989)(neither environmental cleanup nor costs to
prevent future pollution to the environment constitute "property damages").
19. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 399 A.2d 877 (1979).
20. Town of Epping v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 444 A.2d 496, 498 (1982).
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/5
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biguous when viewed in the insurance context.2" Although
conceding that environmental damages caused by improper
disposal of hazardous wastes could constitute property dam-
age, the court felt that the dispositive issue was whether
cleanup costs fell within the meaning of damages. 2 Thus, the
court held that the term "damages" was not ambiguous and
its plain meaning, in the insurance context, refers to legal
damages and does not include cleanup costs. 23 While not re-
jecting the rule of construction that terms of an insurance
contract are to be given their ordinary meaning, the Fourth
Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., supported
this position.' In this action, the insurer sought a declaratory
judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify its insured in
a CERCLA action for sums incurred in the cleanup of hazard-
ous waste contamination. The court, stating that judicial deci-
sions have "limited the breadth of the definition of 'dam-
ages,' ,,25 subscribed to a legal, technical definition of the term
"damages." While injunctive and restitutionary relief often in-
volve an expenditure of funds, "damages" as used in a CGL
policy only includes "payments to third persons when those
persons have a legal claim for damages. '2 6 Therefore, the term
"damages" is to be understood in its "accepted technical
meaning in law."'2 7
The courts have also decided that construing the term
"damages" in a limited way "is consistent with the provision
21. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 985 (8th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988). It is interesting to
note that the court in Independent Petrochemical Corp.(IPC) v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., while acknowledging that the home circuit's view of state law is entitled
to deference, declined to follow the NEPACCO court which was also applying Mis-
souri law. Nos. 89-5367, 89-5368 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1991) at 11. Instead, the IPC
court found that the "[tiechnical meaning is the exception rather than the rule in
Missouri, and the insurers therefore also had to show that the parties intended to be
bound by it." Id. at 19-20.
22. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
at 983.
23. Id. at 985.
24. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987).
25. Id.
26. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
27. Id.
1991]
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defining the insurer's obligation as a whole." 8 The courts hold
that an insurer does not agree under the CGL policy to pay
"all sums" which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay;
the insurer agrees to pay all "sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages." 9 Further, the
courts, as in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., believe
that if the term were given a broad meaning, then the term
"damages" would become "mere surplusage because any obli-
gation to pay would be covered."30 This would cause the
phrase "as damages" to be ineffective.3 The court in Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Armco, inc. determined that damages
had a specific meaning which limited the insured's obligation
under the policy and found that the government's claim for
relief was not a claim for damages and therefore was not cov-
ered under the terms of the insurance policy.32
2. Equitable Relief-Injunctive Relief
The second position taken by the courts is that under the
CGL policy the insurer must only pay for legal damages and
not for such equitable monetary relief as cleanup costs.33
"Black letter insurance law holds that claims for equitable re-
lief are not claims for 'damages' under liability insurance
28. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
at 986; see also, Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979; Maryland Casu-
alty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352; Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224
F.2d at 503.
29. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 432 (D. Md. 1986),
aff'd 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
30. Id. See also Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 842 F.2d at 986; Maryland Cup Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisc.,
568 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 1990).
31. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352.
32. Id.
33. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1988); Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 449, 503-504 (5th Cir.
1955); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. at 432; United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 842 F.2d at 987; Verlan, Ltd. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 695 F. Supp. 950,
954 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F.
Supp. 437, 450 (D. Kan. 1990).
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contracts. 34
"In defining 'damages' and distinguishing 'damages' from
equitable remedies,"3 " the court in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Armco, Inc. focused "not on the nature of the underlying ac-
tion, but rather on the form of relief sought."'3' The court
found that the recovery of cleanup costs would not remedy
the injury sustained; rather, a claim for cleanup cost recovery
is designed to reimburse the government for restoring the con-
taminated property to its status quo. Accordingly, a claim for
reimbursement of cleanup costs is not a claim for damages; it
is a claim for equitable relief which is not recoverable under
the policy.37
The CERCLA statute itself provides an inherent distinc-
tion between forms of relief for environmental pollution. The
relief sought may be either cleanup costs or compensatory
damages for injury to, or destruction of, the environment.38 In
Continental Insurance Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Co., the court differentiated sections 107(a)(4)(A)
and (B) from (C).3 Under section (A), a PRP is liable for "all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State."40 Section (B) holds a PRP lia-
ble for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person."'4' Both sections (A) and (B) are considered to
be cleanup costs which differ from section (C) which consti-
tutes "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources." 4' A district court in Washington agreed that when
the government seeks recovery of cleanup costs under
§107(a)(4)(A) or (B), the lawsuits are equitable actions for
monetary relief in the form of restitution or reimbursement of
34. Maryland Casualty v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. at 432.
35. Maryland Casualty v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1352.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
39. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
at 985.
40. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
41. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
42. 842 F.2d at 987.
1991]
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costs, and a jury trial is not usually provided.4 3
One court analogized liability for response costs to the
cost of complying with health and safety regulations." The
court stated that "while such costs are mandated by govern-
ment agencies,... CGL policies do not cover such costs. Such
costs are merely part of the cost of doing business .... [s]uch
costs are not covered by CGL policies, any more than the cost
of installing fire extinguishers as required by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. '45 If the federal govern-
ment sought recovery for "damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources '46 under § 107(a)(4)(C), there
is a greater likelihood of recovering costs under the CGL pol-
icy.4 7 The CGL policy covers "damages" but not cleanup costs
which are expenditures for complying with the directives of
regulatory agencies." The costs of removing an obstruction as
required by a mandatory injunction are not sums that the in-
sureds were obligated to pay as damages within the meaning
of the CGL policy.4 9
3. Prophylactic Measures
The third approach taken by those courts holding that
cleanup costs do not constitute damages asserts that cleanup
costs are merely prophylactic measures. Insurers typically "re-
imburse only damages arising from actual, tangible injury,"
and do not insure prophylactic measures because their risks
are more difficult to estimate and "are not connected with a
harm to specific third parties. '50 This position reasons that
remedial action taken by the government is a prophylactic
43. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Wash., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 742, 744 (W.D.
Wash. 1988).
44. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp.
958 (D. Idaho 1989).
45. Id. at 962.
46. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
47. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. at
962.
48. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d at 1354.
49. Id.
50. Id, at 1353.
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measure because the government is attempting to avert future
harm to humans and the environment where no specific third
party is affected. Allowing coverage of prophylactic measures
would provide the insured with the ability to overuse its in-
surance resources to the detriment of its insurer. The Armco
court "decline[d] to extend the obligations of insurance carri-
ers beyond the well-illumined area of tangible injury and into
the murky and boundless realm of injury prevention."'"
B. Cleanup Costs Constitute Damages
There are also courts which have taken the opposing posi-
tion and have found coverage based on two different theo-
ries." The first theory finds that the term "damages" shouldbe interpreted using its plain, ordinary meaning. 3 The second
51. Id. at 1354.
52. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp.
1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich. 1988)(the cleanup costs are essentially compensatory dam-
ages for injury to common property and for that reason the insurer has a duty to
defend); Unigard Mutual Ins. Co. v. McCarty's Inc., No. 83-1441, slip op. at 5 (D.
Idaho Aug. 4, 1989)(the insurers could have limited the definition of "damages" by
simply including a sentence in the policy that damages do not include equitable re-
lief); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D.
Pa. 1989), amended in part, 738 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990)(response costs are not
equitable in nature and therefore are recoverable as "damages"); Aerojet-General
Corp. v. San Mateo County Superior Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d 973, opinion omitted 257
Cal. Rptr. 621, 627 (1st Dist.), petition for reh'g denied, 211 Cal. App. 3d 216, 258
Cal. Rptr. 684 (1989)(the cost of government directed cleanup costs constitute
damages).
53. Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir.
1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990)(an average person reading the policy would
believe himself covered for demands and potential "damage" claims asserted in an
administrative proceeding); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Meenan Oil Co., No. 84-CV-
3285 slip op. at 25 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 1990)(the average person does not differentiate
between damages and restitution); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen,
Inc., No. 88-1994, slip op. at 8, 57 U.S.L.W. 2270 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), appeal dis-
missed, 879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, No. 88-1994 (D.N.J.
June 27, 1990)(the average person would conclude that cleanup costs constitute an
obligation to pay damages); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
673 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Del 1987)(an ordinary definition of the word "damages"
makes no distinction between actions at law and actions in equity and therefore the
underlying action would be covered); Donaldson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No.
88-6690 slip op. at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Middlesex County Ct. Apr. 4, 1990)(court
applied broad definition to the term "damages" to include costs for environmental
cleanup).
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theory focuses on the substance of governmental cleanup
mandates to find that cleanup costs constitute damages.5
1. Plain, Ordinary Meaning
One theory is that the word "damages" has a plain, ordi-
nary and popular meaning. This theory relies on the layman's
dictionary definition, one of which defines "damages" as: "the
estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sus-
tained: compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a
wrong or injury caused by violation of a legal right." 5 The
dictionary does not make a distinction between an action in
equity and one in law. 5s When construed by the courts using
the dictionary definition, the term "damages" includes costs
that a PRP would be "legally obligated to pay" for injunctive
relief, statutory response costs, or other required remedial ac-
tions enforceable in a legal proceeding.5 7 In National Indem-
nity Co. v. United States Pollution Control, the court, apply-
ing Oklahoma law, found that the term "damages" covered
response and environmental cleanup costs." Judge West
54. Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., No. 87-4438, slip op. at 32
(D. N.J. June 5, 1990)(expenses incurred pursuant to environmental agency directives
are compensable damages under the policies); National Indem. Co. v. United States
Pollution Control, 717 F. Supp. 765, 767 (W.D. Okla. 1989)(the term "damages" cov-
ers response and environmental cleanup costs); Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 703 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D. Del. 1989)(court held that the term
"damages" does not, as a matter of law, exclude costs of cleaning up a site); Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 372 (E.D. Pa.
1989)("damages" has been held to include equitable relief and therefore expenses in-
curred in cleanup operations could fall within the meaning of the policy); Intel Corp.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1988)(govern-
mentally mandated cleanup and investigation costs are "damages" and are fully com-
pensable under a comprehensive general liability policy); United States Aviex Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W. 2d 838, 843 (Mich. App. 1983)(the mere fact that the
EPA chose to clean up the site itself is merely fortuitous and should not excuse the
insurer from liability on the policy); Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casu-
alty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)(costs incurred in carrying
out legally mandated abatement actions are recoverable as "damages").
55. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (1976).
56. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359,
1365 (D. Del. 1987)
57. Id.
58. National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, 717 F. Supp. at 767.
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found that "[t]he policy defined damages in an inclusive man-
ner only, leaving the term open to interpretation;"59 therefore,
because the policy "did not affirmatively limit the definition
of damages to the legal definition only,"60 the court found that
the plain ordinary meaning applied.61 Another court which
came to the same conclusion held that the court could not
"ride to the rescue" of the insurers because they imprudently
failed to limit the term "damages. "62
In an action involving a state administrative proceeding
rather than a CERCLA action, Avondale Industries Inc. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co. stated that "an ordinary business-
man reading th[e] policy would have believed himself covered
for the demands and potential damage claims being asserted
in the. . .administrative proceeding."63 The court ruled that
"[t]he average person would not engage in a complex compari-
son of legal and equitable remedies in order to define 'as dam-
ages,' but would conclude based on the plain meaning of the
words that the cleanup costs. . .would constitute an obliga-
tion to pay damages." '64
2. Substance of Governmental Cleanup Mandates
Courts which find that cleanup costs constitute damages
sometimes rely on a second theory which focuses on the sub-
stance of governmental cleanup mandates rather than on their
form.6 5 These courts hold that the mere fact that the EPA
chose to clean up the site itself and then sue for reimburse-
ment, rather than suing originally for damages, should not ex-
cuse the insurer from liability on the policy.6 One court
59. Id. at 766.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarty's Inc., No. 83-1441 at 5.
63. Avondale Indus. Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d at 1207.
64. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994 at 8, 57
U.S.L.W. 2270 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), appeal dismissed, 879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989),
vacated on other grounds, No. 88-1994 (D.N.J. June 27, 1990).
65. See United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W. 2d 838 (Mich.
App. 1983). See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683
F. Supp. 1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
66. United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d at 842-843. See
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noted, "it is merely fortuitous from the standpoint of either
plaintiff or defendant that the state has chosen to have plain-
tiff remedy the contamination problem, rather than choosing
to incur the costs of cleanup itself and then suing plaintiff to
recover those costs."' 67 In this context, another court stated,
"[ilt would defy logic to suggest that direct payment [by the
insured] was not 'damages,' but that reimbursement was."6 8
The same court further found that the existence of coverage
should not be based on whether the government does or di-
rects the work and seeks reimbursement.6 9 "If the government
undertook the cleanup and sued the responsible parties for
the cost, certainly such an award would be considered
damages. ,,70
Supporting this theory is the idea that the technical
meaning of "damages" includes the relief sought by the in-
sured because there is legal coercion involved. The rationale is
'that because the government is coercing the PRP to clean up
the site, it is equivalent to bringing a legal action for dam-
ages. 71 The court in Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co.,72 found that the fact that the potentially respon-
sible party's obligation is not in the form of a civil judgment
or a criminal fine does not alter the fundamental nature of his
obligation.73 The court stated that the PRP's "participation in
the 'consent' decree is a polite way in which the EPA fore-
bears the use of its legal authority to compel cleanup. '74
also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139;
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. H. Brown Co., No. 87-56134 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Kent Co.
Sept. 29, 1989).
67. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. at
1170 (W.D. Mich. 1988), citing United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336
N.W. 2d at 843.
68. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994 at 8-9.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.E. Cal.
1988).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1190.
[Vol. 9
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/5
SUPERIORFUND
III. Recent State High Court Decisions
Eight state high courts have recently addressed the
"damages" issue in nine different decisions. Of these, three
decisions found in favor of the insurance carriers holding that
cleanup costs are not damages75 and six favored the insureds
and found that cleanup costs are damages. 76 Additionally, the
"damages" issue is pending before the highest courts of sev-
eral other states."
A. Cleanup Costs do not Constitute Damages
Those state high courts which held that cleanup costs do
not constitute damages relied on several different theories and
previously decided opinions. The first theory uses a reasona-
ble person standard while the second theory asserts that a
lack of understanding of the policy terms does not create an
ambiguity. The last theory is that cleanup costs are either
preventive measures or pollution control and are not damages.
1. Reasonable Person Standard
One of the theories on which the state high courts relied
was that the reasonable person would believe that cleanup
costs do not constitute damages. A reasonable or ordinarily
intelligent person reading the CGL policy carefully would
agree that cleanup costs are not covered under the policy.78
Further, it is argued that there are many words in an insur-
ance policy which may not be understood by a first time
reader. However, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that
"only by completely eliminating the phrase 'as damages' can
75. See infra notes 78, 84, 87.
76. See infra notes 88, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99.
77. Jones Truck Lines v. Trans. Ins. Co., Nos. 89-1729, 89-1759, (3d Cir. submit-
ted Feb. 27, 1990); Polkow v. Citizens Ins. Co., 435 Mich. 863 (1990).
78. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16,18 (Me. 1990) (where
Maine Department of Environmental Protection ordered cleanup of pollution which
resulted from leaking underground storage tanks located on the insured's property
the court held that the ordinarily intelligent insured engaged in a more than casual
reading of the policy would not consider money spent to meet the DEP's demands to
be sums which the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages).
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coverage be found, ' 79 and that simply because the words are
not understood by the first time reader "would not justify ex-
cising words from the contract."80
2. Lack of Understanding of the CGL Policy Terms is
not an Ambiguity
A second theory which the courts relied on was that there
may be a lack of understanding by insureds as to the term "as
damages." This, however, does not mean that the term is am-
biguous. An ambiguity is only created by the courts when they
interpret the terms and "convert . . . an insured's hope or as-
sumption that every out-of-pocket payment is covered into a
part of the contract language." 81
3. Preventive Measures - Pollution Control
The third theory relied upon by the courts is that cleanup
costs are either preventive measures or pollution control, but
they do not constitute "damages. 81 2 The high court in Maine
held that cleanup costs are expenses that may be required to
halt continuing pollution and are not property damage.83 The
same court, applying New Hampshire law, found that the
costs of installing a gasoline recovery system to recover leaked
gasoline and prevent further gasoline contamination were not
covered under the CGL policy.84 The court relied on
Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co.,85 where the court
found that the costs of removing an obstruction as required
by a mandatory injunction are not sums that the insureds
were obligated to pay as damages within the meaning of the
general liability policy.86
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also addressed the
79. Id. at 19 n.7.
80. Id. at 27.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 18; see also Lido Co. of New England, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
574 A.2d 299, 301 (Me. 1990).
83. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 19 (Me.. 1990).
84. Lido Co. of New England, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 574 A.2d at 301.
85. 106 A.2d 196 (N.H. 1954).
86. Id. at 199.
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"damages" issue by vacating an appeal summarily affirming a
lower court's favorable decision on the "damages" issue. The
court vacated acceptance of the appeal as improvidently
issued."
B. Cleanup Costs Constitute Damages
Those state high courts which held that cleanup costs
constitute damages relied on several different theories. The
first theory follows a plain meaning approach and the second
theory uses a reasonable person standard. The final theory
puts a limitation on the term damages.
1. Plain Meaning Rejects Legal/Technical Meaning
The first theory relied upon by courts holding that
cleanup costs constitute damages was that the plain meaning
of "damages" should be followed rather than a legal/technical
meaning.8 The Washington Supreme Court ruled that in in-
terpreting the term "damages" one should "look to standard
English language dictionaries" for definition.8 9 Accordingly,
the term "damages" was not being used in its legal and tech-
nical sense in the policies, but rather in its ordinary meaning.
"The plain, ordinary meaning of damages as defined by the
dictionary defeats insurers' argument. Standard dictionaries
uniformly define the term 'damages' inclusively, without mak-
ing any distinction between sums awarded on a 'legal' or 'eq-
uitable' claim. "90
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with this rea-
soning and held that "the term 'damages' is not being used in
its legal and technical sense in these [CGL] policies." '91 A
more recently decided case, AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior
87. Troy Mills, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 89-311 slip op. at 36 (N.H.
Feb. 13, 1990).
88. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 511 (1990), reconsid-
eration denied, No. 55700-4 (Wash. Jan. 4, 1990).
89. Id. at 877, 784 P.2d at 511.
90. Id.
91. C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557,
557 (N.C. 1990).
1991]
19
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Court of Santa Clara County,92 also construed the term dam-
ages using a plain and ordinary meaning.93 The California
court held that where the insured sought coverage for govern-
ment-ordered cleanup costs the remedies sought by the agen-
cies satisfied the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase
'damages.'9" The most current case on the issue, A. Y. McDon-
ald Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North
America,a  also followed the plain meaning theory and ex-
pressed that the term damages should not be given a meaning
which only a specialist or expert in insurance matters would
afford the term, rather, undefined terms in the policy should
be given their ordinary meaning.9 6
2. Reasonable Person Standard
Those courts holding that cleanup costs constitute "dam-
ages" also decided that the standard to be used in interpret-
ing the terms of the policy is that of the reasonable person.
However, these courts found that the reasonable person would
think that the term "damages" included the costs of cleaning
up a waste site. 7 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
in supporting this view held that "a reasonable policyholder
reading the language would fairly expect that the policy cov-
ered amounts he must spend to correct pollution damage for
which the law holds him responsible." 8 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court found that "[i]t is consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the insureds under these policies that the
cleanup costs be covered." 99 Finally, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court agreed that the word "damages" includes
92. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1279.
95. A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 89-1722 (Iowa
Sept. 18, 1991).
96. Id. at 31.
97. Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576
(Mass. 1990).
98. Id. at 583.
99. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 181
(Minn. 1990).
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cleanup costs because a reasonable business person purchas-
ing a comprehensive general liability insurance policy would
expect cleanup of toxic wastes pursuant to government order
to be covered unless the policy explicitly limited the term's
meaning.100
3. Limitation on the Term "Damages"
Several of the courts which held that cleanup costs con-
stitute "damages" narrowed their holdings and decided that
the term "damages" does not cover safety measures or other
preventive costs taken in advance of any damage to prop-
erty.101 In the Boeing case, the court noted that the term
"damages," as the policy states, must be "because of property
damage."102 Thus, safety measures and preventive costs which
are not property damages would not be covered by the policy.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed and held
that where there has been no property damage "costs incurred
in complying with an injunction or order directed to damage
prevention or costs incurred in complying with the law"' 1 3 are
not covered. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "purely
preventive measures are not covered in the absence of prop-
erty damage. 1 0 4 And lastly, the court in AIU Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court of Santa Clara County held that the costs of
compliance with injunctions ordering the insured to undertake
prophylactic measures are not covered by CGL policies cover-
ing payment of damages.10 5
IV. Analysis of the Problem
As the above discussion shows, the state courts of last re-
100. C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d
557, 570 (N.C. 1990).
101. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 529 reconsideration
denied, No. 55700-4 (Wash. Jan. 4, 1990); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d at 582; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 457 N.W.2d at 184.
102. Boeing, 784 P.2d at 512.
103. Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d at 582.
104. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 184.
105. 799 P.2d 1253, 1276 (Cal. 1990).
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sort are well on their way to a consensus on the issue of
whether the term "damages" encompasses the cost of cleaning
up hazardous waste sites. In six cases, the courts ruled in
favor of the insureds, holding that cleanup costs constitute
"damages." 106 In only three cases, decided by two courts,107
the holdings were in favor of the insurers, with rulings that
cleanup costs do not constitute "damages."
Enormous sums are being expended by both the insureds
and insurers to litigate over the meaning of the term "dam-
ages."10 8 For an insurance carrier, it would be difficult to be-
lieve that the damages issue will be resolved in its favor in
future state court decisions. Certainly, the stream of recent
decisions does not provide a basis for such a prediction. This
leads to the question of why insurers should litigate this issue;
or more precisely, why should they spend exorbitant sums of
money in arguing the question? It seems wasteful to spend
such enormous sums on litigation and end up with a result
which hardly solves the problem. Lest one forget, the over-
arching problem facing the insurance industry, as well as soci-
ety, is cleaning up hazardous waste sites. It seems clear that
such sums of money could be better spent cleaning up the en-
vironment rather than paying litigation costs associated with
policyholder litigation.109
V. Suggested Alternatives
Two possible alternatives are appropriate for the insur-
ance industry. One of these solutions is the creation of a
106. See supra notes 88, 91, 92, 95, 97, 99.
107. See supra notes 78, 84, 87.
108. There are also several other terms in the Comprehensive General Liability
policy which are being disputed in the courts; for example, what is an "occurrence,"
what is "property damage," and is there a "suit" against the policyholder.
109. According to M.R. Greenberg, Chairman of American International'Group,
Inc., to date, fewer than five percent of the sites listed on the National Priorities list
have been cleaned up. Cleanup work has been commenced at hundreds of sites; how-
ever, there has been little improvement to our environment compared to the vast
amount of money spent by the PRPs and their insurers in litigation. "We must find a
new way to fund America's environmental cleanup, which one federal agency has esti-
mated could be a '30-to-60-year, $500 billion problem.'" M.R. Greenberg, 'No-Fault'
Plan to Clear Hazardous-Waste Sites, WALL ST. J., April 23, 1991, at A23.
[Vol. 9
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/5
SUPERIORFUND
cleanup fund. A second solution is the avoidance of litigation
through settlement.
A. Amend CERCLA - Create a Superior Cleanup Fund
The goal of Superfund when enacted was to prevent pol-
lution and to force the polluters to bear the costs of hazardous
waste disposal. The Senate Report states explicitly that Con-
gress designed CERCLA to "assur[e] that those who benefit
financially from a commercial activity internalize the health
and environmental costs of that activity into the cost of doing
business."" 0 The polluters should be deterred from continu-
ing the practices of polluting. Deterrence is ineffective where
the polluters are allowed to pass the costs of cleaning up a
hazardous waste site on to their insurers. The insurance com-
panies become the "deep pocket" of industry when they are
charged with the costs of cleaning up Superfund sites, an out-
come which the insurance companies have been fighting tooth
and nail. As this comment shows, the insurers have been in-
volved in much litigation in an attempt to avoid paying the
costs of cleanup."'
In order to avoid the polluters' costs being passed on to
the insurance companies, and to avoid the problem of poor
waste disposal habits on the part of the polluters, the insur-
ance industry should encourage members of Congress to
amend CERCLA in 1994 when reauthorization is expected.
This amendment should provide that government-mandated
cleanup costs arising under CERCLA are not insurable inter-
ests; therefore, these costs can not be passed on to the pol-
110. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980).
111. Testimony presented to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Policy Re-
search and Insurance Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs indicates
that in a 1989 study of thirteen insurers, the insurers were involved in 1,962 lawsuits
with insureds over pollution coverage issues and that they had spent millions of dol-
lars in legal costs pursuing these lawsuits and defending insureds. The insurers indi-
cated that they spent an average of 15.8 million dollars on these suits. United States
General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Policy Re-
search and Insurance, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of
Representatives, Hazardous Waste, Pollution Claims Experience of Property/Casu-
alty Insurers, 4-5 (February 1991).
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luters' insurers. The polluters, or PRPs, would still be held
responsible for payment of cleanup costs, but these costs
could not be passed on to the insurer.
If cleanup costs were uninsurable, an alternative source of
funds would be necessary to pay for these costs. One alterna-
tive would be the establishment of a pollution fund to clean
up hazardous waste sites." 2 The present CERCLA process
would continue to determine who was responsible for the dis-
posal of the hazardous waste. The PRPs would then turn to
the cleanup fund to pay that percentage of cleanup costs for
which they had responsibility, while private party claims for
property damage and bodily injury would continue to be
brought against the CGL policies.
Contribution to the cleanup fund would be mandatory for
those parties identified as PRPs at currently existing
Superfund sites, with contribution based on compiled volu-
metric rankings for all the sites listed on the National Priori-
ties List (NPL)."3 A numerical factor would be multiplied by
the volumetric ranking to determine a particular PRP's con-
tribution. As new sites were added to the NPL, the PRPs in-
volved at particular sites would be required to contribute in
proportion to their percentage of waste sent to the site in rela-
tion to all other PRPs and their contributions at all other
sites.
PRPs who were later removed from the PRP list would
be reimbursed the amount which they had contributed. If a
site were removed from the NPL, the corresponding PRPs
and percentages would be removed from the cleanup fund. In
the same manner, new sites would generate more PRP
contributions.
112. Although Superfund was created with a 1.6 billion dollar tax on the pe-
trochemical industry which was increased to 8.5 billion dollars in 1986, it has proven
to be inadequate as very few sites have actually been cleaned up. Jon F. DeWitt &
Charles M. Denton Personal Liability Under CERCLA for Corporate Officers and
Directors, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 375 (August 15, 1990).
113. In addition to contribution being based on the volumetric ranking of the
PRP, another approach would be to base the contribution on both the PRP ranking
and the toxicity of the PRP's waste. This approach may be more difficult to
administer.
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For those companies which have declared bankruptcy, the
present funds in the Superfund would be used to clean up the
site; however, if the cleanup costs were to surpass the re-
sources of the Superfund, then either the PRPs at the partic-
ular site would be responsible for the bankrupt companies'
contribution or a guaranty fund could be established whereby
the PRPs contribute a fixed percentage to cover the failed
companies.
Insurance companies would not be afforded a windfall be-
cause they would also be required to contribute to the fund.
At least two methods of including the insurance companies in
the cleanup fund are proposed. One way is to require insur-
ance companies to contribute to the fund based on a percent-
age of premiums earned on the pre-1986 CGL policies'14 of
those insureds involved as PRPs at hazardous waste sites at
the time of the enactment of this proposed legislation. The
second method is to tax the insurance companies prospec-
tively; a tax would be levied on all Comprehensive General
Liability policies written after the enactment of this proposed
alternative. This approach would spread the cost of hazardous
waste cleanup throughout the general public as opposed to
merely impacting the insurance companies and PRPs. Either
plan would allow the insurance companies to return to the
business of writing insurance and to provide some form of pol-
lution coverage without the fear of Superfund's harsh liability
scheme."1 These plans would also assure cleanup solutions in
114. The pre-1986 date would be appropriate because before the 1970s, insurers
provided coverage for a broad range of coverage under the Comprehensive General
Liability policies. See supra pp. 5-6. Beginning in the late 1960s through the 1970s
insurers began revising their policies and added a pollution exclusion clause to specify
that the CGL policies only covered sudden and accidental pollution events. In the
1980s, these pollution exclusions were even further limited to exclude pollution inci-
dents. Between late 1985 and early 1986, insurers stopped providing policies covering
pollution-related damages. DONALD S. MALECKI & ARTHUR L. FLITNER, THE NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER COMPANY, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY - THE NEW CLAIMS-MADE
AND OCCURRENCE FORMS, 44-48 (2d ed. 1986).
115. As indicated in the previous footnote, the insurers stopped writing CGL pol-
icies which might cover pollution. Although in the 1970s the insurers created exclu-
sions in their policies in an attempt to limit the coverage of pollution, the courts have
not interpreted these exclusions as the insurers intended in their contracts. See supra
notes 52-54. This is why the insurers are very hesitant to write policies which may be
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an expedited manner.
B. Insurers' Alternative - Settle Out of Court
If the alternative proposed above were not to be adopted,
a second solution for insurance carriers would be to seek alter-
natives to the litigation process. It would certainly seem wiser
to remove these disputes from litigation, where possible, in or-
der to save time and money. As the decisions to date have not
favored the insurers, such a course of action would save both
the insurers' and the insureds' resources for better uses.
It is in the interests of insurers to settle out of court
where the jurisdictional law is unfavorable to the insurers. In-
surers should only litigate where the action is defensible, in
those few states which have decided that cleanup costs are not
covered under the CGL, or where other coverage defenses
exist.
VI. Conclusion
As this analysis has attempted to show, the state high
courts seem to be well on their way to reaching a consensus on
the issue of whether the term "damages" in a CGL policy en-
compasses the cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. In
six state high court cases, the courts have held in favor of the
insureds, holding that cleanup costs constitute "damages." In
only three state high court cases, decided by two courts, the
holdings were in favor of insurers with rulings that cleanup
costs do not constitute "damages." Several cases presenting
the damages issue are pending before the highest state courts,
and authorities believe that they will follow the present trend
and rule in favor of the policyholders.
Two possible alternatives to resolve the insurance carri-
ers' dilemma regarding the "damages" question are proposed
in this comment. The preferred alternative would be to amend
CERCLA and make cleanup costs an uninsurable interest.
With reimbursement of cleanup costs by insurers prohibited,
an alternative source of funds would be necessary. One solu-
construed to cover pollution events.
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tion to the problem which would assure cleanups in an expe-
dited manner would be the creation of a pollution fund to
clean up hazardous waste sites.
A less desirable alternative would be for insurance carri-
ers to seek an alternative to litigation such as settling out of
court. This would save both time and money, and both the
insurers and the insureds could put their resources to better
use.
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